Paul Boghossian
Silver Professor of Philosophy, New York University
I am Silver Professor of Philosophy at NYU’s Philosophy Department, and Distinguished Research Professor at the University of Birmingham in the UK. I am the director of the New York Institute of Philosophy and the Director of NYU’s Global Institute for Advanced Study. I was Chair of Philosophy from 1994-2004.
My research interests are primarily in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and the philosophy of language.
I have written on a variety of topics, including color, rule-following, eliminativism, naturalism, self-knowledge, a priori knowledge, analytic truth, realism, relativism, the aesthetics of music and the concept of genocide.
I have held fellowships from the National Endowment for the Humanities, Magdalen College (Oxford), the School of Advanced Study (University of London), and the Australian National University (Canberra). I have been a Visitor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, a Fulbright Senior Specialist and am a Fellow of the New York Institute for the Humanities.
I have also taught at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and at Princeton.
I served on the Global Citizenship Commission headed by former UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, and currently serve on the University of London’s School of Advanced Study Strategic Advisory Board.
Research
Books
New Essays on Normative Realism. edited, with Christopher Peacocke. Oxford University Press. [Oxford Academic]
Classical Music: Contemporary Perspectives and Challenges. edited, with Michael Beckerman. Open Book Publishers. [PDF]
Debating the A Priori . Oxford University Press. [Oxford Academic]
Content and Justification: Philosophical Papers. Oxford University Press. [Oxford Academic]
Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism. Oxford University Press. [Oxford Academic]
New Essays on the A Priori. edited, with Christopher Peacocke. Oxford University Press. [Oxford Academic]
Articles
A Priori
The Significance of A Priori Justification. In B. Roeber, E. Sosa, M. Steup, & J. Turri (Eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd Edition (pp. 183-190), Wiley-Blackwell.
Do We Have Reason to Doubt the Importance of the Distinction between A Priori and A Posteriori Knowledge? A Reply to Williamson. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 137-155), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Williamson on the Distinction between the A Priori and the A Posteriori Once Again. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 168-174), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 186-207), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 214-226), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Williamson on the A Priori and the Analytic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82(2), pp. 488-497. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Introduction . In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (pp. 1-10), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Aesthetics
The Perception of Music: Comments on Peacocke. The British Journal of Aesthetics 50(1), pp. 71-76. [PDF] [oup.com]
On Music Reproduction. Inner-World Audio (Jan 01, 2009), pp. 34-35. [inner-magazines.com]
Explaining Musical Experience. In K. Stock (Eds.), Philosophers on Music: Experience, Meaning, and Work (pp. 117-129), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
On Hearing the Music in the Sound: Scruton on Musical Expression. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60(1), pp. 49-55. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Analyticity
Postscript: Further Thoughts about Analyticity, 20 Years Later. In B. Hale, C. Wright, & A. Miller (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, 2nd Edition (pp. 611-618), John Wiley & Sons. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Epistemic Analyticity: A Defense. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66(1), pp. 13-35. [PDF] [brill.com]
Analyticity. In B. Hale & C. Wright (Eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language (pp. 331-368), Blackwell. [PDF]
Analyticity Reconsidered. Noûs 30(3), pp. 360-391. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Inferential Role Semantics and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction. Philosophical Studies 73(2-3), pp. 109-122. [PDF] [springer.com]
Analyticity and Conceptual Truth. Philosophical Issues 5(1), pp. 117-131. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Cognitive Science and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction: Comments on Horwich. Philosophical Issues 3(1), pp. 135-142. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Color
Physicalist Theories of Color . The Philosophical Review 100(1), pp. 67-106. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Colour as a Secondary Quality . Mind 98(389), pp. 81-103. [PDF] [oup.com]
Content
The Normativity of Meaning Revisited. In B. Dunaway & D. Plunkett (Eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes from the Work of Allan Gibbard (pp. 389-401), Maize. [PDF] [fulcrum.org]
Is (Determinate) Meaning a Naturalistic Phenomenon?. In S. Gross, N. Tebben, & M. Williams (Eds.), Meaning Without Representation: Essays on Truth, Expression, Normativity, and Naturalism (pp. 331-358), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Reply to Otero's “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89(1), pp. 182-184. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Our Grasp of the Concept of Truth: Reflections on Künne. Dialectica 64(4), pp. 553-563. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Is Meaning Normative?. In C. Nimtz & A. Beckermann (Eds.), Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5, Mentis. [PDF]
The Normativity of Content. Philosophical Issues 13(1), pp. 31-45. [PDF] [wiley.com]
The Transparency of Mental Content. Philosophical Perspectives 8(n/a), pp. 33-50. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Does an Inferential Role Semantics Rest Upon a Mistake?. Mind & Language 8(1), pp. 27-40. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Externalism and Inference. Philosophical Issues 2(1), pp. 11-28. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Reply to Schiffer. Philosophical Issues 2(1), pp. 39-42. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Naturalizing Content. In B. Loewer & G. Rey (Eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics (pp. 65-86), Blackwell. [PDF]
The Status of Content Revisited. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 71(4), pp. 264-278. [PDF] [wiley.com]
The Status of Content. The Philosophical Review 99(2), pp. 157-184. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17(1), pp. 5-26. [PDF] [pdcnet.org]
Epistemic Justification
Epistemic Rules. The Journal of Philosophy 105(9), pp. 472-500. [PDF] [pdcnet.org]
Blind Reasoning. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77(1), pp. 225-248. [PDF] [wiley.com]
How Are Objective Epistemic Reasons Possible?. Philosophical Studies 106(1-2), pp. 1-40. [PDF] [springer.com]
Genocide
The Concept of Genocide. Journal of Genocide Research 12(1-2), pp. 69-80. [PDF] [tandfonline.com]
Response to My Critics. Journal of Genocide Research 12(1-2), pp. 105-112. [PDF] [tandfonline.com]
Inference
Logic and Reasoning . In F. Ferrari, E. Brendel, M. Carrara, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, & F. Steinberger (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic (pp. n/a), Oxford University Press.
Inference, Agency, and Responsibility. In M. B. Jackson & B. B. Jackson (Eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking (pp. 101-124), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Delimiting the Boundaries of Inference. Philosophical Issues 28(1), pp. 55-69. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Reasoning and Reflection: A Reply to Kornblith. Analysis 76(1), pp. 41-54. [PDF] [oup.com]
Rationality, Reasoning and Rules: Reflections on Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning. Philosophical Studies 173(12), pp. 3385-3397. [PDF] [springer.com]
What is Inference?. Philosophical Studies 169(1), pp. 1-18. [PDF] [springer.com]
Reply to Otero's “Boghossian’s Inference Argument against Content Externalism Reversed”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89(1), pp. 182-184. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Inference and Insight. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63(3), pp. 633-640. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Externalism and Inference. Philosophical Issues 2(1), pp. 11-28. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Intuition
Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 186-207), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Reply to Williamson on Intuition, Understanding, and the A Priori. In Debating the A Priori (pp. 214-226), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Intuitions and the Understanding. In M. A. Fernández Vargas (Eds.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications (pp. 137-150), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Seemings: Sensory and Intellectual. In A. Benedek & K. Nyíri (Eds.), Beyond Words: Pictures, Parables, Paradoxes (pp. 203-208), Peter Lang. [peterlang.com]
Philosophy Without Intuitions? A Reply to Cappelen. Analytic Philosophy 55(4), pp. 368-381. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Virtuous Intuitions: Comments on Lecture 3 of Ernest Sosa’s “A Virtue Epistemology”. Philosophical Studies 144(1), pp. 111-119. [PDF] [springer.com]
Meaning
The Problem of Meaning in the later Wittgenstein. In A. H. Khani & G. Kemp (Eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (pp. n/a), Routledge. [PDF]
Philosophy of Logic
Logic and Reasoning . In F. Ferrari, E. Brendel, M. Carrara, O. Hjortland, G. Sagi, G. Sher, & F. Steinberger (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Logic (pp. n/a), Oxford University Press.
Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic . Mind 133(529), pp. 86-116. [PDF] [oup.com]
Knowledge of Logic. In P. Boghossian & C. Peacocke (Eds.), New Essays on the A Priori (pp. 229-254), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Relativism
Establishing Moral Norms by Convention: Comments on Baghramian’s and Coliva’s Relativism. Analysis 82(3), pp. 506-513. [PDF] [oup.com]
La réalité telle qu'elle est, en soi. In E. Alloa & É. During (Eds.), Choses en soi: métaphysique du réalisme (pp. 271-281), PUF. [cairn.info]
Relativism about Morality. In C. Kanzian, S. Kletzl, J. Mitterer, & K. Neges (Eds.), Realism—Relativism—Constructivism: Proceedings of the 38th International Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg (pp. 301-312), De Gruyter. [PDF] [degruyterbrill.com]
Is Comparative Philosophy Based Upon a Mistake? A Reply to Ganeri’s ›Re:emergent Philosophy‹. Confluence: Journal of World Philosophies 4, pp. 149-153. [PDF] [nomos-elibrary.de]
Reply to Amini and Caldwell, “Boghossian’s Refutation of Relativism”. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2(1), pp. 45-49. [PDF] [brill.com]
The Maze of Moral Relativism. The New York Times (Jul 24, 2011). [PDF] [nytimes.com]
Three Kinds of Relativism. In S. Hales (Eds.), A Companion to Relativism (pp. 53-69), John Wiley & Sons. [PDF] [wiley.com]
Epistemic Relativism. In S. Bernecker & D. Pritchard (Eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology (pp. 75-83), Routledge. [PDF] [taylorfrancis.com]
Précis of Fear of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 141(3), pp. 377-378. [PDF] [springer.com]
Replies to Wright, MacFarlane and Sosa. Philosophical Studies 141(3), pp. 409-432. [PDF] [springer.com]
The Case Against Epistemic Relativism: Replies to Rosen and Neta. Episteme 4(1), pp. 49-65. [PDF] [cambridge.org]
What is Relativism?. In P. Greenough & M. Lynch (Eds.), Truth and Realism (pp. 13-37), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Constructivist and Relativist Conceptions of Knowledge in Contemporary (Anti-)Epistemology: A Reply to Barbara Herrnstein Smith. South Atlantic Quarterly 101(1), pp. 213-227. [PDF] [dukeupress.edu]
What is Social Construction?. The Times Literary Supplement (Feb 23, 2001), no. 5108, pp. 6-8. [PDF] [gale.com]
What the Sokal hoax ought to teach us. The Times Literary Supplement (Dec 13, 1996), no. 4889, pp. 14-15. [PDF] [gale.com]
Rule-following
The Problem of Meaning in the later Wittgenstein. In A. H. Khani & G. Kemp (Eds.), Wittgenstein and Other Philosophers (pp. n/a), Routledge. [PDF]
Kripke, Quine, the ‘Adoption Problem’ and the Empirical Conception of Logic . Mind 133(529), pp. 86-116. [PDF] [oup.com]
Rules, Norms and Principles: A Conceptual Framework. In M. Araszkiewicz, P. Banaś, T. Gizbert-Studnicki, & K. Płeszka (Eds.), Problems of Normativity, Rules and Rule-Following (pp. 3-11), Springer Verlag. [PDF] [springer.com]
What is Inference?. Philosophical Studies 169(1), pp. 1-18. [PDF] [springer.com]
Blind Rule-Following. In A. Coliva (Eds.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright (pp. 27-48), Oxford University Press. [PDF] [oup.com]
Epistemic Rules. The Journal of Philosophy 105(9), pp. 472-500. [PDF] [pdcnet.org]
Rules, Meaning and Intention: Discussion [Review of Philip Pettit, Rules, Meaning and Norms]. Philosophical Studies 124(2), pp. 185-197. [PDF] [springer.com]
Is Meaning Normative?. In C. Nimtz & A. Beckermann (Eds.), Philosophy-Science-Scientific Philosophy, Main Lectures and Colloquia of GAP.5, Mentis. [PDF]
Sense, Reference and Rule-Following [Review of Jerrold Katz, The Metaphysics of Meaning]. Philosophical Issues 4(1), pp. 135-141. [PDF] [jstor.org]
The Rule-Following Considerations. Mind 98(392), pp. 507-549. [PDF] [oup.com]
Self-knowledge
Further Thoughts on the Transparency of Mental Content. In Sanford C. Goldberg (Eds.), Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism: New Essays (pp. 97-112), Cambridge University Press. [PDF] [cambridge.org]
The Transparency of Mental Content Revisited. Philosophical Studies 155(3), pp. 457-465. [PDF] [springer.com]
What the Externalist Can Know a Priori. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97(1), pp. 161-176. [PDF] [wiley.com]
The Transparency of Mental Content. Philosophical Perspectives 8(n/a), pp. 33-50. [PDF] [jstor.org]
Content and Self-Knowledge. Philosophical Topics 17(1), pp. 5-26. [PDF] [pdcnet.org]
Teaching
Graduate
- Proseminar
Spring 2026 • with Michael Strevens - Topics in Epistemology
Spring 2025 • with Declan Smithies - Proseminar
Fall 2024 • with Kit Fine - Topics in Philosophical Logic
Spring 2021 • with Crispin Wright - Seminar on Inference and its Epistemology
Spring 2018 • with Crispin Wright - Research Seminar: Meaning and Normativity
Spring 2017 • with Paul Horwich - Proseminar
Spring 2016 • with Kit Fine - Seminar on the A Priori
Spring 2014 • with Crispin Wright - Proseminar
Fall 2012 • with Crispin Wright - Proseminar
Fall 2010 • with David Velleman - Research Seminar on Mind and Language
Fall 2008 - Proseminar
Fall 2006 • with David Velleman - Topics in Epistemology
Spring 2006 • with Paul Horwich - Thesis Prep Seminar
Spring 2004 - Thesis Prep Seminar
Fall 2003 - Epistemology
Spring 2003 - Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Meaning, Rules, & Justification
Spring 2002 • with Paul Horwich - Epistemology
Spring 2001 • with Christopher Peacocke - Research Seminar on Language and Mind: The Objectivity of Knowledge
Spring 1999 • with Stephen Schiffer - Research Seminar on Language and Mind: Concepts
Spring 1998 • with Ned Block
Undergraduate
- Topics in Ethics & Political Philosophy
Spring 2022 - Topics in Ethics and Political Philosophy
Spring 2020 - Probability, Logic, Knowledge and Inference
Fall 2010 • with Gerard Ben Arous • taught at NYUAD - Topics in Language & Mind
Fall 2001 - Topics in Metaphysics & Epistemology
Fall 2000 - Topics in Language & Mind
Fall 1997
Contact
NYU Philosophy Department
5 Washington Place, Room 505
New York, NY 10003
Phone: (212) 998-8333
Email: paul DOT boghossian AT nyu DOT edu